Technology driven inequality leads to poverty and resource depletion by Usman Mirza, M. et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Ecological Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon
Analysis
Technology driven inequality leads to poverty and resource depletion
M. Usman Mirzaa,b,⁎, Andries Richterb, Egbert H. van Nesa, Marten Scheffera
a Environmental Sciences, Wageningen University, Netherlands
b Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Sub-department of Economics, Wageningen University, Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Inequality
Technology
Social-ecological systems
Poverty trap
Dynamic systems
Critical transitions
A B S T R A C T
The rapid rise in inequality is often seen to go in-hand with resource overuse. Examples include water extraction
in Pakistan, land degradation in Bangladesh, forest harvesting in Sub-Saharan Africa and industrial fishing in
Lake Victoria. While access to ecosystem services provided by common pool resources mitigates poverty, ex-
clusive access to technology by wealthy individuals may fuel excessive resource extraction and deplete the
resource, thus widening the wealth gap. We use a stylised social-ecological model, to illustrate how a positive
feedback between wealth and technology may fuel local inequality. The resulting rise in local inequality can lead
to resource degradation and critical transitions such as ecological resource collapse and unexpected increase in
poverty. Further, we find that societies may evolve towards a stable state of few wealthy and many poor in-
dividuals, where the distribution of wealth depends on how access to technology is distributed. Overall, our
results illustrate how access to technology may be a mechanism that fuels resource degradation and conse-
quently pushes most vulnerable members of society into a poverty trap.
1. Introduction
In growing societies, long-term poverty can be explained by the concept
of a “poverty trap” (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Here, poverty acts as an
attractor where individual wealth dynamics can be trapped in poverty's
“basin of attraction”. The nature of poverty can be persistent, as individuals
trapped in its basin of attraction cannot get out on their own accord
(Bowles et al., 2006; Naschold, 2013; Barrett et al., 2006; Dutta and Kumar,
2015; Toth, 2014). At the micro level, poverty can be conceptualized as a
self-reinforcing phenomenon limiting the growth of an individual's wealth
(Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Barrett and Carter, 2013). Self-reinforcing
phenomena emerge from a range of wealth-technology positive feedbacks
or frictions causing wealth dynamics to be highly non-linear with local
thresholds and increasing returns (Ghatak, 2015; Zimmerman and Carter,
2003; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002). These in-
clude financial factors such as access to low return assets, the set-up cost of
high-tech equipment or political economy aspects such as imperfect mar-
kets, credit constraints to better technology adaption, differentiated op-
portunities (Barrett and Carter, 2013; Barrett et al., 2015; Banerjee and
Newman, 1993). The problem with the persistence of poverty is that it is
not only devastating for individuals but can also, over time, lead to per-
sistent inequality within an otherwise growing society.
Different theories attempt to explain the long-run behaviour of in-
equality. Kuznets in 1955 introduced the hypothesis that inequality rises
at first and then drops as gains are distributed more evenly in developing
economies, giving rise to an inverted U shaped curve (Kuznet, 1955).
Recently, Piketty (2014) proposed that in modern capitalistic societies
inequality will rise in absence of government interventions or cata-
strophic events, such as world wars and the great depression. Milanovic
(2016) builds upon both Kuznets and Piketty to propose that inequality
moves in cycles – the so-called Kuznets waves. Most of existing research
on inequality dynamics has focused on macro level analysis, with little or
no focus on local level pathways connecting social-ecological interactions
to inequality (Hamann et al., 2018). Addressing the need to focus on
local level interactions, we develop a stylised dynamic model illustrating
how key feedbacks and mechanisms can lead to rising inequality in de-
veloping societies relying on an ecological resource for livelihood. In
studying this stylized model, our contribution to the literature is twofold.
First, we unpack complex inequality dynamics by showing how a simple
wealth-technology feedback can explain rising local inequality, and
second, what pathways allow rising inequality to trigger poverty and
resource degradation, considering dynamic socio-ecological interactions.
Indications of a wealth-technology feedback, as a driver of in-
equality, can be found in both modern and ancient societies. Kohler
et al.'s (2017) reconstruction of wealth inequality dynamics in post-
Neolithic societies reveals the marked difference between continents.
Wealth disparities long remained limited in North America and Me-
soamerica while in Eurasia inequality rose much more. Evidence
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suggests that this contrast is due to the availability of large mammals in
Eurasia that were domesticated, which is an ancient equivalent to
better technology, allowing agricultural extensification (Kohler et al.,
2017). Most likely, only richer households could maintain draft animals
allowing them to profit from higher production. Meanwhile in North
America and Mesoamerica, such amplification of wealth differences by
exclusive access of an elite few to superior productivity was absent.
Similarly, in modern times, numerous case studies illustrate how
resource use with technological access to a few can aggravate both in-
equality and poverty. For example, in Pakistan structural inequality in
access to water across regions and between social classes has placed
unprecedented stress on water resources (Mustafa et al., 2013; Mustafa,
2007). The roots of inequality can be traced back to colonial times when
land rights were based on patronage exclusive for a few chosen groups of
elites (Farooqi and Wegerich, 2014; Gilmartin, 1994). Preferential land
rights gave birth to big landowners who accumulated wealth and con-
trolled the resource (van Halsema and Vincent, 2006). With modern
technology, wealth accumulation took the form of commercial agri-
culture, where tube wells assisted water overuse (Shah, 2008), and other
lucrative but water-intensive production options like textiles, cement,
leather, fertilizers and sugarcane. As a result, small and tenant farmers
are pushed-off the resource and forced to migrate (Rahman, 2012).
This and other examples from Amazon rainforest (Godoy et al.,
2010), Bangladesh (Alam, 2003) and Lake Victoria (Downing et al.,
2014), show a recurring pattern of increased resource exploitation that
goes hand in hand with growing local inequality. Wealth accumulation
by elites is achieved by extracting and controlling natural resources, on
which the poor population typically also relies, such as commercial
agriculture via groundwater exploitation, overfishing for exports and
depletion of forests for timber or alternative land use (Shah, 2008;
Godoy et al., 2010; Alam, 2003; Downing et al., 2014; ISSC et al., 2016;
Arnold and Townson, 1998). As a result, in unequal societies, fast
wealth accumulation by the elites may put excessive pressure on key
natural resources thus affecting the dependent poor population. Ex-
cessive resource use affects dependent livelihoods (Daily, 1997;
Cavendish, 2000; Fisher and Christopher, 2007), especially in
developing societies where the poor have a primary dependence on
ecological or natural resources (McNally et al., 2011; Coomes et al.,
2011; Naughton-Treves et al., 2011; Lybbert et al., 2011). Thus local
inequality can be disastrous for social-ecological resilience and social
justice, as wealth accumulation of elites may fuel overexploitation,
disregarding sustainable resource use limits (Farley and Voinov, 2016)
and at the same time disproportionately affecting the poor and most
vulnerable members of society.
While equity in distribution is an important aspect of social justice
(Sen, 2009), the ability to access resources is also important for the re-
silience of the poor (Mirza and Mustafa, 2016). If access to capital,
technology and resources are restricted to the elites, wealth accumula-
tion and resource extraction for this elite becomes a self-reinforcing
phenomenon (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2016; Rosen, 1981).
Wealth wields power to extract resources which in turn generates more
wealth, thus mounting pressure on the common natural resource. Left
unchecked, this pressure can lead to overexploitation causing environ-
mental degradation or even resource collapse, upon passing certain
thresholds (Carpenter and Brock, 2008; Scheffer, 2007). Such critical
transitions in underlying resources can be sudden, unexpected and in
some cases irreversible (Scheffer et al., 2001), with disastrous implica-
tions for the dependent population (Lade et al., 2013).
There is a need to understand inherent inequality dynamics to de-
termine whether observed patterns described above can be generalized
to a much broader set of conditions. In this paper, based on a simple
model of local social-ecological interactions in a developing society set-
ting, we argue that resource extraction with a technological advantage
exclusive to a few is an important driver of inequality. In particular, we
investigate whether rising local inequality leads to reduced resilience of
the interdependent social and ecological systems causing critical transi-
tions such as resource collapse and/or poverty traps.
2. Methods
We develop a simple coupled social-ecological model to analyse and
understand the influence of rising local level inequality on poverty and
Fig. 1. Conceptual sketch of the model structure and interactions showing two feedbacks – wealth-technology and resource-wealth. Boxes and thick arrows and
represent state variables and flows between them. Ovals and thinner arrows represent parameters and processes.
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resource use in an unregulated regime. We begin by outlining key
model mechanisms through a conceptual diagram (Fig. 1), which is
meant to illustrate and aid the actual model description. In the diagram,
we see interactions and feedbacks between the social and ecological
components of the model through resource extraction and access to
technology. Access to technology may give rise to local thresholds
(positive wealth-technology feedback) if an increase in the productivity
of assets is highly non-linear with respect to increasing assets. For ex-
ample, a poor farmer may be relatively unproductive because he only
owns an ox to plough the fields. A fisherman in a large lake may be
limited to smaller radius only due to a small-sized boat. As individuals
get richer, they may gain access to technologically better assets with a
higher productivity. A farmer investing in a tractor may experience a
local increase in total and marginal productivity, and the same may be
true for a fisher buying a bigger boat. Technology-driven enhanced
resource extraction, while stimulating growth of wealth, also negatively
affects the growth of resources, which in turn limits the amount of re-
source available for future extraction (resource-wealth feedback).
These two feedbacks (wealth-technology and resource-wealth) com-
bined can potentially put exploitative pressure on the resource, which
can become depleted or collapse below a certain sustainable threshold.
2.1. Ecological component (resources)
Resource users have access to a common pool resource (X) that
provides services used for earning an income. Resource availability is
determined by the dynamics of the ecological resource type in question.
We use two examples for ecological resources, portraying a simple
abiotic resource (e.g. water) and a more complex biotic resource (e.g. a
forest or fish population), building upon earlier approaches (Lade et al.,
2013; Ibáñez et al., 2004; Tavoni et al., 2012) in specifying the func-
tional form of those resources. These two types of resources are chosen
as two examples of qualitatively different resource dynamics. The
simple abiotic resource is assumed to increase with a constant rate (for
instance due to precipitation) and to lose as a first order process (for
instance due to transpiration). This results in growth towards an equi-
librium with exponential growth limitation (Richter and Dakos, 2015):
=Abiotic dX
dt
c X
X
e a X: 1 ( , , )
m x
N
i i i
a 1 (1)
X is the total available resource stock, c is the resource inflow, Xmax
is the maximum resource level, and ∑1Nei is individual resource ex-
traction summed over all individuals, which in turn is a function of
technology σi, capital assets ai and the resource stock itself X. The
functional form of ei is provided later in the section.
The biotic resource is motivated by population dynamics examples
where a living resource (e.g. fish population) grows logistically but can
also collapse if the population is below a critical size, for instance, due
to group behaviour or difficulty in finding partners. This well-studied
ecological positive feedback is called the Allee effect (Kuparinen et al.,
2014; Allee, 1931; Dennis, 1989), and the following functional form is
widely used for a range of biotic population dynamics (Kramer et al.,
2009; Berec et al., 2007; Courchamp et al., 1999):
=Biotic dX
dt
X X X X
X
e a X: [ ] 1 ( , , )c
max
N
i i i1 (2)
where ϵ is the maximum growth rate of the resource and Xc is the cri-
tical sustainable resource level.
The abiotic resource model has only one stable equilibrium
(Fig. 2a), while the biotic resource model can have three equilibria of
which two are stable (Fig. 2b). Resources are used as input in a pro-
duction process through which individuals generate income and accu-
mulate wealth over time.
2.2. Social component (wealth)
In the model, income yi of individual i is generated using a simpli-
fied Cobb–Douglas production function which uses a combination of
natural resources and assets [Eq. (3)]. The function has two inputs –
capital assets ai and resource extraction ei– and is given as:=y a a e a X( ) ( , , )i i i i i i i (3)
where σi(ai) is the technology function, mapping inputs into output and
α is the partial output elasticity of assets. α < 1 is assumed for mar-
ginally decreasing returns on assets.
2.2.1. Technology
We assume that above a certain level of assets, individuals get ac-
cess to advanced technology (Fig. 3). In our model, the parameter ρ
determines the strength of this non-linear effect. Thus, an individual's
asset level may generate non-convexities with locally increasing mar-
ginal returns. In the model, non-convexity is introduced through the
technology function σi as follows:
= + +k aa(1 )i i ii (4)
σi is specified to range from 0 to maximum k, which is a measure of
maximum productivity given available access to technology and scaled
to 1. λ controls the enhanced wealth generation capacity gained by
access to better technology while θ is the asset level where increasing
Fig. 2. Two models of resources with a constant harvesting pressure: abiotic (a) and biotic resource (b). A shift from a black to red line represents an increase in losses
due to resource extraction or harvesting. Note in (b) the distance between the stable (high resource) and unstable equilibrium decreases indicating loss of resilience of
the sustainable equilibrium. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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returns start to set in, determining the presence of these locally in-
creasing returns due to investment in better technology for individuals
in a continuum between uniform (ρ=0) to differentiated (ρ > 0) ac-
cess to technology. When ρ=0 everyone in the society has access to the
same basic technology, giving a standard concave production function
with decreasing marginal returns as conventionally assumed in eco-
nomic models [Fig. 3(a) & (c)]. However, if ρ > 0, the production
function will be non-convex and marginal returns of assets may be lo-
cally increasing or decreasing, depending on the asset level [Fig. 3(b) &
(d)]. Thus in effect, ρ is actually a control parameter allowing us to
switch between a basic null model (diminishing returns when ρ=0)
and a model that includes differentiated access to resources (locally
increasing returns when ρ > 0).
2.2.2. Resource extraction
Individuals as optimizing agents choose resource extraction to
maximize profits. Profits πi depend on income minus costs of produc-
tion and are given as:= y a e C e a X( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i i i i (5)
The cost function depends on the assets owned, amount extracted
and resource availability. Marginal costs are assumed to depend posi-
tively on the extraction level and negatively on both resource abun-
dance and assets owned. The more one extracts, the higher the costs to
extract an additional unit of water. Having better assets and abundant
water availability makes it cheaper to extract an additional unit of
water. With these properties, the cost function for an individual i is
specified as follows:
=C a X
X a
e ( , , )
2i
i i i
i
2
(6)
Parameters γ and τ determine the cost-output elasticity of resource
abundance and assets respectively where γ, τ < 1. Substituting income
and cost functions gives an expression for the profit function:
= a a e e
X a
( )
2i i i i i
i
i
2
The institutional regime is described as open access, and therefore
discounted long-term profits from the resource cannot be secured. Hence,
agents maximize instantaneous profits by setting = 0ei , provided our cost
function is concave > > < > < >( )0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0Ce Ce CX CX Ca Cai i i i i i2 2 2 2 2 2 ,
which gives us the optimal short-term resource use function as follows:
=e a X a( )i i i i (7)
where β= τ+ α. Resource use ei depends on the amount of resource
available X, on an individual's level of assets owned ai, as well as a tech-
nology function σi.
Assets generate wealth, thus endowing individual's ability to in-
tensify use of resources. Long-term wealth dynamics for each individual
i are given by:
=da
dt
s y a e X µ a( , , , )i i i i i i i i (8)
Here savings rate si with income yi gives assets inflow while a de-
preciation loss term μi gives assets outflow, thus signalling an in-
dividual's wealth accumulation or loss respectively in the long run.
Fig. 3. Effect of technology access (ρ) on total and marginal returns to assets. Dark grey region denotes increasing returns while light grey denotes decreasing returns.
(a) & (c) presents the case with uniform access to technology (ρ=0) where resource productivity diminishes as we deploy more of the same type of assets, while (b) &
(d) represent differentiated technology access options (ρ > 0) where resource productivity increases locally when a technological superior asset is deployed. Blue
dotted lines delimit areas of decreasing or increasing returns. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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From here on, assets and wealth will be used interchangeably based on
similarity of usage and broader meaning. Savings rate is assumed to be
constant over time for the sake of simplicity. Note that the amount of
wealth accumulated depends critically on the individual's savings rate
(s), access to technology (ρ) and maximum productivity (k).
This study was conceived as a theoretical exercise and hence chosen
parameters are not motivated by any empirical case(s) but selected to
show qualitative changes and different stability regimes in the model.
Following Ayres, 1988; Juster et al., 2006 and Modigliani, 1986, we
focus on technology (ρ), productivity (k) and savings (s) as key para-
meters in our model, being the most important determinants of wealth
creation, analysed systematically to see how the model results change
qualitatively. A discussion on other key parameters is provided in the
online Appendix.
In our analysis, we begin with simulating social-ecological dynamics
in the homogeneous case i.e. parameters are the same across individuals.
The state space is explored for stable and unstable equilibrium points.
While preserving homogeneity, we also vary key parameters – savings
rate (s) and access of technology (ρ) – for all individuals in a bifurcation
analysis to study the sensitivity and stability of system's equilibrium
states. Bifurcation refers to qualitative changes in a dynamic system's
behaviour as we change a control parameter to cross a critical value. The
critical value or bifurcation point at which this qualitative change occurs
is more popularly known as a tipping point and this behaviour more
generally as a critical transition. Later we relax the homogeneity as-
sumption to simulate social-ecological dynamics with heterogeneous
individuals. Different technology distributions are investigated to study
qualitative changes in inequality dynamics.
3. Results
3.1. Homogenous society case
We begin with simulating a society comprising n=100 homogenous
individuals with both resource types – abiotic and biotic. We analyse the
role of differentiated access to technology. If individuals have uniform
access to technology (ρ=0), there is no opportunity to increase pro-
ductivity through wealth. This implies that rich and poor individuals
would use the same technology, e.g. a hand pump to access water. With
differentiated access to technology (ρ > 0), individuals enjoy higher
productivity as they possess more assets. For example, individuals with
low wealth levels can only afford the hand-pump or small boat while
those better-off invest in electric pumps and motor boats.
In our analysis, stable states are defined in a dynamic systems
context as points where the state variables stabilize or do not change.
These can also be interpreted as equilibrium points in the long run.
Phase plane analysis shows four qualitatively different scenarios for the
system, based on resource type and access to technology [Fig. 4]. For
the abiotic resource case with uniform technology access, we get a
single stable state (SW) [Fig. 4(a)]. Since everyone has access to the
same technology, all individuals reach the same level of wealth and
resource access in the long run. In the case of a biotic resource with
uniform technology, we see more complex dynamics [Fig. 4(b)]. The
potential for the resource to go extinct results in a folded curve with
three internal equilibrium points – two stable (SC and SW) and one
saddle point (ST), indicating the threshold between the two stable fixed
points. SW in Fig. 4(b) is the positive wealth and resource access level,
which is similar to the Fig. 4(a)'s SW for the abiotic case. SC is the new
state we see at the origin depicting social-ecological collapse with dis-
appearance of the resource and wealth. Such collapse may be triggered
by overexploitation, eroding the foundation of resource viability and
corresponding economic activity.
With ρ > 0 individual's access to technology is now differentiated
depending on wealth levels [Fig. 4(c) & (d)]. For an abiotic resource
case, the system now is bi-stable with two stable (SP and SW) equili-
brium solutions [Fig. 4(c)]. The two stable equilibria correspond to the
poor (SP) and wealthy (SW) states respectively. The dashed line re-
presents the separatrix, separating the set of individuals whose wealth
would evolve to one of the stable equilibria in the long run. Depending
on one's wealth level, an individual can either accumulate wealth and
grow to SW or get stuck in poverty at SP, also termed as a “poverty trap”.
Thus both poverty and wealth are stable states, in line with our earlier
discussion on poverty traps. For the last scenario of a biotic resource,
the system now has three stable points (SC, SP and SW) [Fig. 4(d)]. SW
and SP depict the rich and poor states respectively as before, while SC at
the origin represents a case of social-ecological collapse with no re-
source stock and no assets.
3.2. Bifurcation analysis
Savings rates and access to technology are our key control para-
meters. We argue that both parameters play a key role when societies
move through various development phases and are important drivers
for both inequality and resource exploitation. We first analyse the role
of savings (Fig. 5), where the grey shade signifies region of alternative
stable states (bi-stability). Higher savings lead to greater wealth accu-
mulation which in turn allows the individual to invest in enhancing
their resource extraction capacity, e.g. using electric pumps. We analyse
whether this feedback plays a role in breaking the poverty trap and how
this affects the resource at hand.
For the abiotic resource case, we first consider the wealth dynamics
[Fig. 5(a)]. With low savings (s < 0.14) individuals stay poor (branch
P). As savings increase, individuals get richer which allows them to use
superior technology and after a certain threshold (s=0.3) they have
earned enough to break the poverty trap. At higher savings (s > 0.3),
individuals stay wealthy (branch W) and wealth keeps rising. For
0.14 < s < 0.3, the system is bi-stable (grey shaded region), which
means that here individuals depending on their initial wealth levels can
converge either to the wealthy or the poor state. This is due to the
differentiated access to technology which allows higher wealth accu-
mulation to those who are initially wealthy and benefit from access to
better technology. For the resource [Fig. 5(b)], similar dynamics are
seen but in the reverse direction. As rising savings spur wealth accu-
mulation, the resulting resource use puts increasing stress on resource
availability. As a result, resource decreases with increasing s.
For the biotic resource case, starting with the wealth dynamics
[Fig. 5(c)], individuals stay in the poverty trap for s < 0.13 (branch P),
moving on to alternative stable states for 0.13 < s < 0.43 (grey shaded
region) and then finally jumping to the wealthy state at s=0.43 (branch
W). However, in contrast to the abiotic case, the wealthy state suddenly
becomes unstable again at s=0.65, forming a cliff like figure. With higher
savings, as individuals accumulate more wealth and use more resources,
the biotic resource collapses below a certain point due to the exploitative
pressure. For the resource [Fig. 5(d)], as the pressure builds up with higher
savings, it eventually collapses in this rather catastrophic shift, resulting in
social-ecological collapse where individuals metaphorically ‘fall off the
cliff’ as the resource disappeared which formed the foundation of society's
wealth. The two lower bifurcations in Fig. 5(d) are the fold bifurcations of
the two saddle nodes with unstable fixed points. They are not important
for dynamics past the tipping point as resource collapses after the stable
branch W, irrespective of the two lower bifurcations.
We now turn to analysing the role of access to technology (ρ) on
wealth and the resource stock (Fig. 6). While savings allow an in-
dividual to increase the rate of wealth generation irrespective of the
initial endowment, the effects of access to technology (ρ) depend on
individual's current wealth level. So in a differentiated technology re-
gime (ρ > 0), rich individuals have higher productivity and can in-
crease their wealth accumulation compared to poor individuals.
At low levels of ρ technology is relatively uniform, so initial wealth
conditions do not matter, thus there is only one stable state. As we
increase technological differentiation, alternative stable states emerge
for both ρ > 0.45 (abiotic resource) and ρ > 0.26 (biotic resource)
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respectively. Beginning from a poor state (branch P) and moving from
right to left, as we decrease ρ (i.e. making access to technology more
uniform for everyone), a saddle node bifurcation occurs at ρ=0.45 for
the abiotic resource [Fig. 6(a) & (b)] and ρ=0.26 for the biotic re-
source [Fig. 6(c) & (d)], where the system jumps to the unique stable
equilibrium (branch W where everyone is equally wealthy). As before,
the grey shaded area depicts a region of alternative stable states. In-
terestingly, we find that the more differentiated the technology is
(larger ρ), the lower the wealth levels in the poverty state. Intuitively,
this happens because with an increasing ρ, productivity of the poor is
lower, reinforcing the poor state, and also affecting the absolute pov-
erty level within that state. Consequently, we see that the resource
increases as ρ increases in the poor state, simply because of lacking
capacity to extract the resource.
To analyse how savings rate and access to technology act in concert,
we now project bifurcation results in a two-parameter (s and ρ) space and
identify critical transitions [Fig. 7]. For the abiotic resource [Fig. 7(a)],
with low savings (s), the system stays in an exclusive poor state, regardless
of access to technology. As savings rate increase, the system transitions
from an exclusively poor state to either a region with alternative stable
states or a region with the exclusively wealthy state, depending on access
to technology (ρ). This V–shaped area of alternative stable states, which
decreases with increasing savings rate, marks a risky region where the
system can potentially flip between poor or wealthy states.
For the biotic resource case [Fig. 7(b)], the situation is similar to the
abiotic case, except that the system may undergo another transition into
a state of social-ecological collapse. At high savings rates, the excessive
pressure erodes the regenerative capacity of the resource and paving the
way to resource extinction. The case where the ecological resource col-
lapses is particular to the biotic resource and the key qualitative differ-
ence between the two resource dynamics. However, in both cases, access
to technology (ρ) regulates this potentially risky region with alternative
stable states, such that at high values of ρ, the region expands, while at
low values of ρ, it vanishes in what is called a cusp point.
3.3. Heterogeneous society case
We now relax the homogeneity assumption by simulating a society
with heterogeneous individuals in a differentiated technology setting
i.e. individuals having access to both small and motorized boats with
different savings rates and initial wealth endowments. We assume that
each individual has an equal chance to receive some initial wealth in
some set interval, giving rise to a uniform distribution. Thus, randomly
distributed wealth levels drawn from a uniform U(min= 0,max=100)
distribution for n=100 individuals. For simplicity, savings are as-
sumed to be normally distributed with mean 0.2 and standard deviation
0.01. Qualitatively, the model results do not depend on whether we use
uniform or normal distributions.
Simulating the system over time we see clusters emerge in the long
run as individuals' wealth distributions transform from an initial uni-
form to a final bi-modal distribution with high and low wealth levels
[Fig. 8(a)]. The rich and poor clusters go hand in hand with the
Fig. 4. Phase plane for the coupled system for uniform access to technology (ρ=0) and differentiated access to technology (ρ > 0) for both biotic and abiotic case.
Blue lines indicate wealth nullclines (da/dt= 0) while red lines indicate resource nullclines (dX/dt= 0). Intersection of nullclines give equilibrium points of the
system. Solid black points are stable equilibriums while hollow points are unstable equilibriums. Dashed black lines are the separatrix delineating the basin of
attraction of stable equilibrium points. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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evolution of local inequality in our model society. A positive upwards
trend is seen between inequality and growth in wealth [Fig. 8(b)],
approaching a moderately long-run value of around 0.5 Gini. This po-
sitive trend is independent of the type of underlying resource – abiotic
or biotic, thus aligning well with our earlier discussion on observed
rising inequalities in growing societies.
Having modelled local inequality dynamics with a heterogeneous
population we can now use the model to see how in a capitalistic so-
ciety, rapid technological changes and emergence of highly productive
sectors will affect the dynamics of inequality and poverty at the local
societal level. By a capitalistic society we mean enhanced overall pro-
ductivity and technology due to capital growth. In our model, this is
captured by the combination of access to advanced technology and
overall productivity. To simulate variation in total productive capacity,
we have modified the parameter k in the technology function [Eq. (4)],
which was so far assumed to be k=1 constant for all individuals.
Contrasting with the homogeneous case (k=1), two more realistic but
distinct scenarios are constructed where an individual's productivity k is
heterogeneous. First, we assume a society of relatively equal opportu-
nities, where everyone has the same probability of benefiting from
better technology and k is following a uniform distribution with U
(min=0,max= 2). Second, we look at the case where a few elite in-
dividuals benefit significantly more from the enhanced technology and
productivity than the rest of society. Thus, k follows a heavy tail gamma
G(scale=1, shape=1) distribution. Distribution parameters are chosen
to keep average k equal to 1 similar to the fixed k scenario, facilitating
comparison.
The evolution of wealth distribution and total resource stock for all
scenarios can be seen from the heat maps and resource dynamics plots
respectively (Fig. 9). For brevity, we only discuss results for the abiotic
resource case. Results for the biotic resource case are provided in the
online Appendix. In the uniform scenario, we see that local inequality
grows in society and stabilises at a Gini value of around 0.6–0.7
[Fig. 9(c)]. The relationship between inequality and average wealth is
similar to that in the fixed k scenario, though in the scenario where k is
uniformly distributed, the average wealth is higher. Interestingly, this
increase in wealth also leads to a higher final inequality level than what
we saw in the homogeneous k scenario (compare Fig. 8(b) with
Fig. 9(c)). So we can see that variation in technology may increase
wealth in society on average, but this will benefit few individuals,
giving rise to inequality.
In a heavy tail scenario, we observe an amplification of the rise of
wealth for the elite few. The heavy tail causes local inequality to rise
much faster than what we saw with a uniform distribution or homo-
geneous case, leading to a final long-term inequality value of around
0.8–0.9 Gini [Fig. 9(g)]. Compared to the uniformly distributed tech-
nology case, three differences stand out. First, with fast-rising in-
equality, poverty increases are stronger, as indicated by the expanded
blue section of the heat maps [Fig. 9(b & f)]. Second, while average
wealth is similar in both cases, we find that inequality is even higher in
Fig. 5. Bifurcation analysis for wealth and resource dynamics with respect to savings rate, in the abiotic resource and biotic resource case. Solid blue lines represent
stable branch of the system while dotted red lines represent the unstable branch. Grey shaded region denotes area of alternative stable states. W and P refer to
wealthy and poor stable state respectively. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 6. Bifurcation analysis for wealth and resource dynamics with respect to access to technology in the abiotic resource and biotic resource case. Solid blue lines
represent stable branch of the system while dotted red lines represent the unstable branch. Grey shaded region denotes area of alternative stable states. W and P refer
to wealthy and poor stable state respectively. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
Fig. 7. Two-parameter bifurcation analysis with respect to savings rate and access to technology for the abiotic and biotic resource case. ASS, W and P refers to
alternative stable states, wealthy state and poor state respectively.
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the case where technology is beneficial for very few individuals
[Fig. 9(c & g)]. Third, in both cases, we see resource depletion, though
this effect is much stronger for the heavy-tail case. The poor are par-
ticularly disadvantaged by these adverse changes as both poverty in-
creases and resource degrades in the society at the same time.
4. Discussion
Rising inequality, as seen in our model, is consistent with growth in
wealth, in line with the positive relationship seen historically (Milanovic
et al., 2011). Overall rising average wealth levels do not lift people out of
poverty as we see inequality persisting side by side with poverty. This
steady persistence of inequality is seen as a standard feature of growing
societies (Milanovic, 2016; Ravallion, 2014), where the wealth-tech-
nology positive feedback skews growth gains towards the better-off, si-
milar to a preferential attachment process. One example where this
patterns can be observed comes from Sub-Saharan Africa where forest
products constitute the main source of livelihood for rural households
(Mead, 1994; Falconer and Koppell, 1990). While forest income is es-
sential for sustaining livelihoods of the poor, the wealthiest in society are
the ones with the ability to harvest at a large scale and are consequently
the heaviest users. The wealthy and powerful capture the resource at
expense of the poor, due to their better skill set, technology and capital
(Arnold and Townson, 1998). As a result, the poor are forced to alter
their practices or shift to less productive areas with high failure and
closure rates (Arnold et al., 1994; Townson, 1995).
Moreover, from the model results, we see that in the modern capi-
talized world, access to capital further accelerates these growth gains
for a small elite, an observation consistent with literature (Atkinson
et al., 2011; Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2015). Here inequality rise
due to the emergence of new productive sectors and associated in-
creasing returns, as people move from traditional ways of wealth ac-
cumulations to more productive capital assets. While, wealth and
technology feed on each other, in a positive feedback, to push in-
equality up, such positive feedbacks may be reinforced by societies
having access to highly productive capital intensive pathways to wealth
generation, which may create poverty traps and result in rapidly rising
inequality in society (Rosen, 1981; Gabaix et al., 2016). However, we
show that capital growth may not, in all scenarios, result in a rapid rise
in inequality and/or cause sudden changes in social-ecological dy-
namics. The growth of elites and final distribution in wealth depend
largely on how productivity gains are distributed.
In a society with uniformly distributed capital productivity gains,
local inequality rises slowly and innocuously while poverty remains at
the same level. At the same time, pressure on the resource remains
within the sustainable limits, irrespective of the resource type.
However, if the same productivity improvement is achieved via a
heavy-tailed distribution, the type of resource becomes important and
inequality rises much faster. With few elites harbouring most of the
productivity gains, the rapid rise in local inequality is seen to correlate
with significant changes in wealth and resource dynamics. Wealth le-
vels rise fast for the highly productive elites as they intensify extraction
pressure due to their particularly high productivity. Pressure on the
resource directly affects income for the poor who do not have the assets
allowing for high productivity, while facing a depleted resource.
Poverty levels and resource pressure both rise, where the impact is
more severe for the biotic resource. This is due to the nature of biotic
resources which are prone to collapse below a critical threshold
abundance level. Nonetheless in both cases, the poor are pushed off the
resource and into poverty. This is consistent with what is seen in in-
tricately connected social-ecological systems, where catastrophic
changes such as a rapid rise in persistent poverty and resource de-
gradation can coincide dynamically in time, forming a tipping point
(Barrett et al., 2011; Scheidel, 2013).
Current model simulations and results need to be interpreted with
caution as this was conceived as a theoretical exercise. While our work
is theoretical in nature, an obvious next step is to test the theoretical
predictions with empirical cases and data. Furthermore, our model at-
tempts to capture key mechanisms needed to analyse inequality dy-
namics within social-ecological interactions. In this ambition, we make
a series of simplifying assumptions that make the model tractable and
analysable while retaining key features. Below we discuss some of our
key assumptions and give cautionary notes where necessary.
Wealth in the model is accumulated via income-generating activ-
ities, using a harvested resource as input. Since we have a single
common pool resource, it is assumed that all parties whether rich or
poor compete in generating income from the same source. We realize
that in the real world multiple resources exist that may interact in
ecologically and socially complex ways (Barrett, 2008). For instance,
rich and poor people may not necessarily compete for the same re-
source, as evidenced in Lake Victoria, where poor people harvest a
smaller species (dagaa) than big companies (Nile perch) (Downing et al.,
2014). A natural extension of our model would be to include n resource
types (where n is small), thus investigating the effects of different
ecological interactions between the resources and the effects of a sec-
ondary resource on society. Although the outcome of these complex
interactions is hard to predict, we expect that it is still likely that the
wealthy have an advantage in both the capacity to harvest and also
access to a greater number of resources than available to the poor. It
would be exciting to compare the relative importance of ecological
Fig. 8. Individuals with fixed technology, and heterogeneous savings rates and initial wealth levels. (a) Distribution of final (bimodal) wealth by initial (uniform)
wealth in society. (b) Rise in inequality with societal growth in average wealth.
M.U. Mirza, et al. Ecological Economics 160 (2019) 215–226
223
interactions (e.g. predator-prey relationships) and economic interac-
tions (e.g. wage or price effects) that could potentially magnify or re-
duce inequality.
In our social-ecological model, there is no response from policy or
resource users as the resource is depleted based on the assumption of
open access. A worthwhile extension to the model would be to analyse
the policy response and effectiveness close to the tipping point, in an
explicitly dynamic setting. An effective response would require decision
makers to anticipate a potential resource collapse, potentially in the
form of early-warning signals and coordinate on an effective policy
response. It remains doubtful whether both conditions will be met given
that the time window to prevent a collapse is limited (Richter and
Dakos, 2015; Biggs et al., 2009).
Our paper paints a rather bleak picture of a developing society
based on the assumptions that the system is capitalistic (Piketty and
Zucman, 2014) and there are no real effective redistribution mechan-
isms (Besley and Persson, 2014). Without a government implementing
tax mechanisms or social safety nets for the poor, we see the stabili-
zation of poverty levels in the long run. One could hypothesize that
with rising inequality societal mechanisms will unfold that will allow
Fig. 9. Effect of heterogeneous productivity via uniform (a–d) and heavy tail (e–h) distributions. For both cases, we see the effect on the evolution of wealth,
inequality, and resource stock.
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for a further redistribution of income. In such cases, we would expect
cyclic behaviour in poverty levels depending on the resource pressure
and the effectiveness of government interventions. Such an analysis is
no doubt a worthwhile exercise and a project in itself. We will leave this
as a topic for future research. In a similar vein, countries that initially
leave their resources to open access may start implementing private or
common property right regimes upon technological improvements,
potentially safeguarding the sustainability of such resources (Copeland
and Taylor, 2009). At the micro level, users may start making co-
operative agreements or craft rules to move towards a regime of sus-
tainability (Richter et al., 2013). It is an entirely open question whether
evolving institutions would benefit the whole society or would be fa-
vouring the ruling elite.
5. Conclusion
Our results present key mechanisms which may explain the emer-
gence of local inequality in a society. A positive feedback between wealth
and technology will allow moderate levels of inequality to emerge in a
growing society. Furthermore, if the initial distribution of technology
and productivity are heterogeneous, as in a capitalistic society, this can
potentially lead to a rapid rise in inequality. With a heavy-tailed dis-
tribution of improved technology in society, fast rise in inequality is
observed where a small elite group achieves accelerated wealth accu-
mulation due to the convolution of better technology, capital income and
resource control. Left unabated, this fast rise in inequality will have
catastrophic effects such as overharvesting of resources and throwing
those dependent on the resource off the resource and into poverty.
Main results from the paper can be summarized as follows: First, in
growing societies, inequality rises in our model society due to an in-
herent positive wealth-technology feedback. Second, capitalistic de-
velopment may result in a much faster rise in inequality and poverty
depending on the distribution of productivity gains in society. Third, for
uniformly distributed capital productivity gains, results show a slow
innocuous rise in inequality. Pressure on resource use goes up, but stays
within sustainable levels. Fourth, for heavy-tailed distributed capital
productivity gains, results show (i) rapid rise in inequality triggering a
collapse in wealth and resource dynamics at the societal level, and (ii)
sharp rise in poverty while resource stocks fall below sustainable levels.
Finally, if the ecological system is prone to collapse, we see that the
positive feedback between wealth accumulation and resource extrac-
tion results in social-ecological collapse with resource extinction.
From a policy perceptive, the key message here is that a growth
based agenda may not only fuel inequality, but also resource depletion.
While it is a public policy choice, how to rank objectives in importance,
our results are a cautionary note on an agenda that is purely driven by
economic growth, i.e. wealth accumulation, without any consideration
for equity. We show that ensuring equality in access to key resources is
not only essential for social justice, but also for improving ecological
resilience and reduction in poverty. We also show that there is not
necessarily a trade-off between inequality and total welfare, as in-
equality may fuel overexploitation which erodes the foundation of so-
ciety's wealth, making everyone worse off in case of a collapse.
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